Louisiana Law Review
Volume 39 | Number 1
Fall 1978

The Political Behavior of Lawyers in the Louisiana
House of Representatives
Patrick F. O'Connor
Richard L. Engstrom
Justin J. Green
Chong Lim Kim

Repository Citation
Patrick F. O'Connor, Richard L. Engstrom, Justin J. Green, and Chong Lim Kim, The Political Behavior of Lawyers in the Louisiana
House of Representatives, 39 La. L. Rev. (1978)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol39/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF LAWYERS IN
THE LOUISIANA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Patrick F. O'Connor*

Justin J. Green* **

Richard L. Engstrom**

Chong Lim Kim****
INTRODUCTION

The preponderance of lawyers in the ranks of those chosen
by voters to occupy important public policy-making positions
has been noted frequently both by academicians and other
observers of politics. Described as "an outstanding phenomenon of American political life,"' the ubiquity of lawyers in politics fascinated such an early and eminent student of the United
States as de Tocquevillel and, if the literature of several disciplines is an indication, continues to intrigue political scientists,
sociologists, and the legal profession itself. Only a fraction of
one percent of the American labor force is engaged in the practice of law, yet lawyers are almost always the most numerous
occupational group among incumbents in a variety of public
offices. 3 One such office is that of state legislator. Lawyers generally constitute from one-quarter to over one-half of the membership of most state legislative chambers. Given the disproportionate number of lawyers, it is understandable that lawyerlegislators would be considered a group deserving special attention,4 and it has become a common suspicion that their predominance carries with it a political significance. 5 It is widely
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1. H.

EULAU & J. SPRAGUE, LAWYERS IN POLITICS:

CONVERGENCE

2. 1 A.

A

STUDY IN PROFESSIONAL

13 (1964).

DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMocRAcY INAMERICA 281-97 (Vintage Books ed. 1945).
3. For occupational data on governors and congressmen, see Schlesinger,
Lawyers in American Politics: A Clarified View, 1 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 26-39 (1957).
4. M. JEWELL & S. PATTERSON, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES
66 (3d ed. 1977).
5. As expressed by Eulau and Sprague: "The mere fact that lawyers are highly
visible in politics is not by itself proof that their presence makes a difference in the
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assumed that the shared educational and occupational experiences of attorneys result in similar attitudes, values, and opinions which form the basis for cooperation in legislative politics,
especially when the legal profession can be considered to have
a stake in the outcome.
Lawyers have been the largest single occupational group
within the Louisiana legislature in recent years, generally comprising over 30% of the membership.! This article investigates
whether lawyers serving in the Louisiana House of Representatives manifest distinctive types of political behavior, and particularly whether they, as a group, are distinguishable in important ways from their non-lawyer colleagues. Broadly addressed will be the question whether the large proportion of
attorneys in the House makes a difference in the functioning
of that institution. Based primarily upon an analysis of roll call
votes in the 1972 through 1975 sessions of the House and upon
personal interviews with representatives conducted in 1972,1
this study will contrast the thirty-five lawyers and seventy-six
non-lawyers serving from 1972 to 1975 along several dimensions
suggested as important in previous writing on the subject.'
FIVE THESES ABOUT THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF LAWYERLEGISLATORS

The suggestions that lawyers in politics have discernible
attributes stemming from their legal background-and that
often they differ from non-lawyers in significant ways-fall into
several broad categories. Five major theses or assumptions frequently surface.
functioning of political institutions. But many observers have certainly believed that
it does." H. EULAu & J. SPRAGUE, supra note 1, at 16*.
6. J. Savoy, Personnel Factors in the Louisiana State Legislature: 1952 through
1972 at 22 (1974) (unpublished master's thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Southwestern Louisiana).
7. The survey was conducted during and immediately following the 1972 session
of the legislature. One hundred of the one hundred and five members were interviewed,
a completion rate of 95%. The interviewing was supervised by Patrick F. O'Connor and
Richard L. Engstrom and supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation
(GS-30405) received by Chong Lim Kim and Justin J. Green.
8. The 105 member chamber experienced some turnover during the four-year
term from 1972 to 1975. As a result, 111 individuals served during the period.
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The Dominant Bloc Thesis

The dominant bloc thesis asserts that lawyers, as a group,
dominate the legislature, not only in the number of seats they
occupy, but also in the political power they wield. The thesis
exists in popular lore and can also be found in scholarly writings.' It consists of two related parts: the alleged cohesion of
lawyers and the relatively great power of the bloc that they
form. It is possible that lawyers could form a legislative bloc,
and yet not have it be a dominant one. However, the reverse is
not true. If lawyers do not behave as a cohesive bloc then it
hardly can be said that, as a group, they dominate legislatures.
Research efforts that have addressed the dominant bloc thesis
have approached it from this perspective. In a variety of legislative settings, researchers have sought evidence of roll call
voting solidarity on the part of lawyers, but the findings have
not shown that lawyers vote together with high cohesion, that
they vote together to a greater extent than do non-lawyers, or
that they exhibit any general tendency to line up on one side
of issues while non-lawyers take the other.'I Only in connection
with the issue of no-fault insurance has any data been reported
that show lawyers differing from non-lawyers in their legislative voting." It generally has been concluded that the lawyerbloc thesis is empirically without merit. Indeed, after looking
at the roll calls in both chambers of Congress from 1937
through 1968 which involved "attacks on the Supreme Court
or the judiciary as an institution, and attempts to reverse or
9. For presentation, though not necessarily advocacy, of these views, see for
example: W. KEEFE & M. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 120-21 (4th ed.
1977); Rutherford, Lawyers as Legislators 195, in THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 53-61 (1938); Derge, The Lawyer as DecisionMaker in the American State Legislature, 21 J. PoL. 426 (1959).
10. Brady, Schmidhauser & Berg, House Lawyers and Support for the Supreme
Court, 35 J. PoL. 724-29 (1973); Derge, supra note 9, at 426-29; Derge, The Lawyer in
the Indiana General Assembly, 6 MIDWEST J. POL. Sci. 47-50 (1962); Berg, Green &
Schmidhauser, Judicial Regime Stability and the Voting Behavior of LawyerLegislators, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1012-22 (1974); Schmidhauser, Berg & Melone, The
Impact of Judicial Decisions: New Dimensions in Supreme Court-CongressionalRelations, 1945-1968, WASH. U.L.Q. 209-51 (1971); Green, Schmidhauser, Berg & Brady,
Lawyers in Congress: A New Look at Some Old Assumptions, 26 W. POL. Q. 440-52
(1973).
11. Dyer, Do Lawyers Vote Differently? A Study of Voting on No-Fault
Insurance, 38 J. PoL. 452-56 (1976).
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limit court decisions" and finding negligible differences in voting between lawyers and non-lawyers, Schmidhauser and his
associates concluded:
This research should lay to rest the notion that lawyers are
a breed of legislators apart from their colleagues ...
[N]ow that possibly the most favorable test imaginable
has been applied [support or opposition to judiciarythreatening legislative votes], and the hypothesis still
found wanting, the legal
profession variable is justifiably
2
branded as irrelevant.1

2. The Competence Thesis
The competence thesis asserts that attorneys by training
possess certain skills and attributes that are distinctly functional in the legislative environment. The concept of competence, an exceedingly broad one that may have many manifestations in a complex environment, has been addressed only
generally in scholarly writing. Robert Agger, for example, hypothesizes that one contribution of lawyers in politics is "to
provide the element of flexibility and the attitude of compromise necessary to multi-group politics,'

3

a theme also empha-

sized by Eulau and Sprague." The suggestion is implicit that,
particularly in a legislative setting, this facility for compromise
gives the lawyer-politician a natural edge in job performance.
Keefe and Ogul take a somewhat different tack by observing
that legal training, "if deficient and illiberal on some counts,
is extraordinarily successful in assisting its recipients to master
the intricacies of human relations, to excel in verbal exchange,
to understand complex technical information, and to employ
varying tactics to seize advantage."' 5 While the tenor of these
12. Green, Schmidhauser, Berg & Brady, supra note 10, at 450 (emphasis
added).
13. Agger, Lawyers in Politics: The Starting Pointfor a New Research Program,
29 TEMP. L.Q. 436 (1956).
14. Eulau and Sprague see a "convergence" of roles played by the professions of
lawyer and politician. "As both are specialists in the accomodation of interests and
the adjustment of conflicting demands, the roles of the lawyer and of the politician
may be considered functionally equivalent." H. EulAU & J. SPRAGUE, supra note 1, at
100.
15. W. KEEFE & M. OGUL, supra note 9, at 120. See Gold, Lawyers in Politics:
An Empirical Exploration of BiographicalData on State Legislatures, 4 PAC. Soc. REV.
84 (1961).
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statements generally reflects the comments in the literature
about the abilities of lawyers in the legislature, it must be
noted that there are dissenting views. Those taking the negative side see legal education as deficient in developing "skills
in negotiation, personnel management, . . . public relations,
[and] those [methods] of observation and thinking that are
necessary to effective policy-making. . ...1 Also expressed is
the view that legal training "fails to educate the young lawyer
in the clarification and selection of alternate values and goals
[which is] a necessary requisite for achieving a democratic
commonwealth."' 7 Despite the force of these dissenting views,
no suggestion is found that lawyers by training possess less
competence for public service than do farmers, mechants, realtors, insurance agents, and other occupational groups that together with lawyers thoroughly dominate the membership of
American legislatures.
3. The Conservatism Thesis
The conservatism thesis maintains that lawyers are
"conservative" both with respect to substantive political philosophy and their approach to decision-making. Social or philosophical conservatism is said to flow from the close relationship
that lawyers develop with the powerful economic interests that
they often represent in private practice. 8 A "conservative"
approach to their political jobs is asserted to result from the
legal profession's reverence for and reliance upon precedent.
This attitude is transferred, it is said, into the political realm
as well. Harold J. Laski states this contention most forcefully,
and according to him, the study of precedent focuses the lawyer's attention on the past. This preoccupation with the legal
handiwork of past generations renders attorneys "more definitely the servants of tradition, than any other class in the
community."'" However, despite these assertions, available
evidence tends to refute the contention that lawyer-legislators
16. H. EuLAu & J. SPRAGUE, supra note 1, at 27.
17. Id.
18. For a discussion of the political philosophy of lawyer-legislators and some
empirical evidence, see H. EuLAu & J. SPRAGUE, supra note 1, at 22-27; Derge, supra
note 9, at 429-31.
19. H. LASKI, A GRAMMAR OF POUTICS 572 (1925).
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are more philosophically conservative than non-lawyers. A
study by Derge of members of the Missouri House found no.
differences between lawyers and non-lawyers either in voting
on selected roll calls "which invited a liberal or conservative
stand on a social or economic issue" or on a fifteen-item attitudinal index measuring liberalism. 0 In fact, Eulau and Sprague,
based upon an attitudinal scale constructed for legislators in
New Jersey, Ohio, Tennessee, and California, actually found
attorneys consistently more liberal than their colleagues.'
The characterization of lawyers as precedent-bound is harder to grapple with empirically, and no systematic evidence on
this point is known to have been gathered." Given the general
inability of scholars to document any behavioral differences
between lawyers and non-lawyers, it is safe to say that this view
of attorneys is empirically questionable.
4.

The Independence Thesis

The thesis that lawyers in legislatures are more
"independent" politically than non-lawyers is expounded from
time to time in the literature, although it does not recur with
the frequency of the previous theses. Robert Agger attributes
the putative political independence of attorneys to the economic independence of a law practice. 3 An attorney may, with
relative ease, divert time from his legal practice and devote it
to politics, and then, if he wishes, shift back to the full-time
practice of law without serious professional consequences. In
fact, the "advertising" that accompanies political campaigns
and officeholding may enhance the earning power of the
lawyer-legislator. These occupational advantages of attorneys
are said to account in part for the fact that so many are found
in politics, and they are also seen as factors which provide for
20. Derge, supra note 9, at 430-31.
21. H. EULAU & J. SPRAGUE, supra note 1, at 26.
22. For an excellent essay calling this trait into serious question, see Hyneman,
Who Makes Our Laws?, 55 POL. Sci. Q. 556-81 (1940).
23. Agger, supra note 3, at 441.
24. The literature on the reasons for the large numbers of lawyers in politics is
fairly extensive. On the "dispensability" theme, see H. EULAU & J. SPRAGUE, supra note
1, at 39-46; M. JEWELL & S. PATTERSON, supra note 4, at 68; D. MATTHEWS, THE SOCIAL
BACKGROUND OF POLITICAL DECISION-MAKERS 31-32 (1954); Derge, The Lawyer in the
Indiana General Assembly, 6 MIDWEST J. POL. Sci. 29-30, 37, 43-44 (1962); Bromall,
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greater political independence. Furthermore, it has been suggested that, just as the reverence for precedent in the law is
transferred into reliance upon tradition in politics, so also does
another attribute of the legal profession manifest itself in political activity: professional ethics demand that the lawyer be free
from certain outside pressures in his relationship with his
clients and that "the risks of captivity . . . be kept to a minimum." 2 5 Eulau and Sprague write in a similar vein that,
"lawyers have, of course, always taken great pride in their independence. The lawyer's independence is assumed to be a necessary condition of his effective performance of the functions he
is called upon to undertake .
1 Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility deals expressly with the principle
of independence in the practice of law," and there is little
doubt that socialization in the legal profession is designed to
sensitize attorneys to the need for independence.
The concept of independence is only very vaguely defined
in academic treatments of lawyers in politics. The forces from
which lawyers are more likely to be independent are not specified. In addition, the proposition has not been directly tested,
though some empirical findings are consistent with it. For example, lawyers in the legislature have been found more likely
than non-lawyers to report that in deciding to run for office
they were "self-motivated" rather than recruited to candidacy
by others?' Also, Derge found that among Indiana legislators
"...

Lawyers in Politics: An Exploratory Study of the Wisconsin Bar, Wis. L. RmV. 751-64
(1968). For explanations of lawyer predominance that focus on factors other than
characteristics of the legal profession itself, see Pedersen, Lawyers in Politics: The
Danish Folketing and United States Legislatures, in COMPARATIVE LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR: FRONrIERs OF RESEARCH ch. 2 (S. Patterson & J. Wahlke eds. 1972); Hain &
Piereson, Lawyers and Politics Revisited: Structural Advantages of LawyerPoliticians, 19 AM. J. POL. Sci. 41-52 (1975); Patterson, Comparative Legislative Behavior: A Review Essay, 12 MIDWEST J. POL. Sci. 599-616 (1968); Schlesinger, supra
note 3, at 26-39.
25. Pedersen, supra note 24, at 41.
26. H. EuLAu & J. SPRAGUE, supra note 1, at 133-34. After noting that traditionally there has been criticism of how well lawyers actually attain the goal of professional
independence, Eulau and Sprague go on to observe: "Nevertheless, in view of the fact
that most lawyer-legislators are private practitioners, it can be assumed that they are
reasonably independent." Id. at 135-36.
27. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 5 reads: "A lawyer should exercise
independent professional judgment on behalf of a client."
28. H. EULAu & J. SPRAGUE, supra note 1, at 68-70.
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running in primary elections, lawyers were more likely than
others to say that party leaders were hostile or neutral to their
candidacies. 9 Derge concluded that the most likely explanation was that the attorney tries to direct his own political career
to a greater extent than the non-lawyer. He is more active in
initiating his opportunities rather than waiting to be called
upon. 30 Despite these findings, it is fair to say that the intriguing and important possibility of more independent behavior on
the part of lawyer-legislators remains to be verified.
5. The Generalist Thesis
The proposition that lawyers are more likely than nonlawyers to be generalists, that is, to be active in several different policy areas, represents an important distinction with respect to political behavior. However, the thesis has not been
extensively explored. Two separate rationales can be offered to
explain why such an orientation might be expected. First,
Eulau and Sprague suggest that legal training may impart a
particular concern with the technical oversight of legislation,
specifically a desire to insure that the language of bills accurately conveys legislative intent.3 ' This is a general concern and
actually pursuing it would take the lawyer-legislator into many
different policy areas. Second, it is argued that a law practice,
involving contact with a wide variety of clients and public officials, broadens the attorney's interests and information and
may result in a generalist stance. 2
Eulau and Sprague in their four-state study showed that
there was a slight tendency for more non-lawyers than lawyers
to designate themselves as experts in three or more policy
areas. However, the differences, although consistent across the
states, were very small and averaged under 4% over the four
33
states studied.
29. Derge, supra note 24, at 29.
30. Id.
31. H. EuLAu & J. SPRAGUE, supra note 1, at 115.
32. Agger, supra note 13, at 441-42. Additionally, Agger has suggested that the
broad professional role of lawyers as "guardians of 'the law' and justice" may incline
lawyers to develop a broad focus for their political role as "representative." Lawyers,
Agger hypothesizes, may be more likely to think of themselves as representing the
community or "everyone" rather than narrower specific interests, thus promoting a
generalist orientation. See Agger, supra note 13, at 438.
33. H. EULAU & J. SPRAGUE, supra note 1, at 113.
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Conclusion
Two facts stand out in the scholarly treatment of lawyers
in legislatures. First, along those dimensions that have been
studied to a substantial degree (the conservatism and dominant bloc theses), expected differences between lawyers and
non-lawyers have not been found. Second, in other important
areas in which differences have been suggested (the independence, competence and generalist theses), little or no effort has
been made to verify or reject their existence. However, so firm
have been the conclusions of the most recent studies that scholars have been explicitly invited to abandon as hopeless the task
3
of documenting disparities in lawyer/non-lawyer behavior. 1
After looking briefly at some of the background characteristics
of both groups in the Louisiana House, this study will present
evidence that bears upon each of the five theses discussed
above, which in seyeral cases departs significantly from the
findings of previous research.
CHARACTERISTICS OF LAWYERS AND NON-LAWYERS IN THE
LOUISIANA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

A great deal of what is already known about lawyers and
non-lawyers in legislative bodies consists of information about
their personal and political backgrounds. While the primary
purpose of this research is to go beyond background and into
behavioral differences, it will be useful to attend briefly to
some individual attributes. Even though this study is confined
to Louisiana legislators, it is possible that the findings will have
a broader applicability. To the extent that the characteristics
of lawyers and non-lawyers in Louisiana parallel those found
in other settings, confidence is increased that these results are
not merely the idiosyncracies of one state, although similar
research elsewhere would be highly desirable.
1. Personal and Background Characteristics
Other studies typically have found lawyer-legislators to
possess several characteristics that distinguish them from their
34.

Green, Schmidhauser, Berg & Brady, supra note 10, at 450.
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colleagues: they tend to be younger, 35 to come from higher status family backgrounds,3 to come from more politically motivated families, 3 to have developed an earlier interest in politics, 3 to have more pre-legislative political experience, 3 to be
more self-motivated in their political activity, 0 and to be more
ambitious to achieve political office beyond the legislature."
Despite the younger age of lawyers, they have generally accumulated about the same amount of tenure in legislative service
as their non-lawyer colleagues.4" Although lawyers may come to
the legislature earlier, the length of their stay is not much
different from others. Finally some studies have reported that
lawyers are more likely to be chosen to represent metropolitan
areas,4 3 while other research has found no urban-rural differences in the type of district represented."
The Louisiana data are consistent with most, but not all,
of these findings. Table la shows that in 1972 Louisiana
lawyer-legislators were indeed substantially younger than the
non-lawyers. Nearly two-thirds (64.7%) of the attorneys were
under forty years of age, while over three-quarters (76%) of the
non-lawyers were forty or over. Despite the age discrepancy,
there was not much difference in length of legislative service
(Table 1b). However, a few percent more non-lawyers were
either first-termers or had served more than two four-year
terms, while lawyers tended to constitute a disproportionate
share of those in their second term.
35. H. EuLAu & J. SPRAoUE, supra note 1, at 45; Hain & Piereson, supra note
24, at 46; Derge, supra note 9, at 419; Ruchelman, Lawyers in the New York State
Legislature:The UrbanFactor, 10 MIDWEST J. POL. Scm. 486 (1966); Derge, supra note
24, at 36-37, 53; Gold, supra note 15, at 86; J. Savoy, Socialization and Background
Characteristicsof LouisianaLegislators: 1968 and 1972 at 16 (March 8-9, 1974) (paper
presented to the annual meeting of the Louisiana Political Science Association, New
Orleans, Louisiana; J. Savoy, supra note 6, at 31-32.
36. H. EuLAu & J. SPRAGUE, supra note 1, at 75-76; Derge, supra note 24, at 22;
Derge, supra note 9, at 418.
37. H. EuLAU & J. SPRAGUE, supra note 1, at 56-64; Derge, supra note 9, at 417;
Derge, supra note 24, at 23.
38. H. EULAU & J. SPRAGUE, supra note 1, at 56-57.
39. Derge, supra note 9, at 416-17; 24, at 25, 27; Gold, supra note 15, at 67.
However, this finding was not consistent in all states studied. See H. EuLAu & J.
SPRAGUE; Derge, supra note 1, at 66; Ruchelman, supra note 35, at 486.
40. Derge, supra note 24, at 28; H. EULAU & J. SPRAGUE, supra note 1, at 67.
41. H. EuLAu & J. SPRAGUE, supra note 1, at 79-80; M. JEWELL & S. PATrERSON
supra note 4, at 67; Hain & Piereson, supra note 24, at 47-49; Ruchelman, supra note
35, at 487-88; Derge, supra note 9, at 419; Derge, supra note 24, at 45.
42. H. EULAU & J. SPRAGUE, supra note 1, at 46-47; Derge, supra note 9, at 422;
Ruchelman, supra note 35, at 487; Derge, supra note 24, at 39, 41-42.
43. Derge, supra note 9, at 420; Ruchelman, supra note 35, at 493.
44. Derge, supra note 24, at 35; Hyneman, supra note 22, at 570-72.
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TABLE 1.

PERSONAL AND POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS (IN PERCENTAGES)
OF LOUISIANA STATE REPRESENTATIVES, 1972-1975

Age

a.
Under 40

40-50 Years

Over 50

Lawyers

64.7

23.5

11.8

100.0 (N=34)

Non-Lawyers

24.0

40.0

36.0

100.0 (N=75)

First
Term

Second
Term

Third Term
or More

Lawyers

52.9

32.4

14.7

100.0 (N=34)

Non-Lawyers

66.7

10.7

22.6

100.0 (N=75)

Tenure

b.

c.

Non-Incumbent Legislators' Self-Report of Motivation to Run
for Their Seats
Urged by Others
Self-Motivated

to Run

Lawyers

78.6

21.4

100.0 (N=14)

Non-Lawyers

70.4

29.6

100.0 (N=31)

Previous Public Officeholding:* All Legislators

d.

None Held

One or More Held

Lawyers

67.9

32.1

100.0 (N=28)

Non-Lawyers

44.4

55.6

100.0 (N=63)

*This includes appointive as well as elected offices.
Previous Public Officeholding:* Legislators Under

e.

Forty Years of Age When First Elected
None Held

One or More Held

Lawyers

78.9

21.1

100.0 (N =19)

Non-Lawyers

43.8

56.3

100.1 (N=16)

*This includes appointive as well as elected offices.
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Education of Father

f.

Less than High School Some College
or More
High School Graduate
Lawyers

37.9

17.2

44.8

99.9 (N-29)

Non-Lawyers

61.4

18.2

20.5

100.1 (N-44)

Political Activity of Family

g.

None or
Vote
Only

Support
Manage
Candidates
and/or
Campaigns
Work in
and/or
Campaigns Run for Office

Lawyers

34.5

41.4

24.1

100.0 (N=29)

Non-Lawyers

23.9

47.8

28.3

100.0 (N=46)

h.

Age of First Interest in Politics
Under 15

15-20 Years

21 and Over

Lawyers

32.1

42.9

25.0

100.0 (N=28)

Non-Lawyers

10.9

32.6

56.5

100.0 (N=46)

Age of First Activity in Politics

Lawyers
Non-Lawyers

j.

Under 21

21-29
Years

30 and Over

37.9

48.2

13.8

99.9 (N=29)

6.8

54.6

38.6

100.0 (N=44)

Stated Ambition to Seek Other Office
Yes

Undecided

No

Lawyers

40.0

12.0

48.0

100.0 (N=25)

Non-Lawyers

25.8

11.3

62.9

100.0 (N=62)
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k.

1.

Stated Ambition to Seek Other Office by Legislators Under 40
Yes

Undecided

No

Lawyers

66.7

20.0

13.3

100.0 (N=15)

Non-Lawyers

30.8

23.1

46.2

100.1 (N=13)

Stated Ambition to Seek Other Office by Legislators Over 40

Lawyers
Non-Lawyers
m.

Yes

Undecided

No

0.0

0.0

100.0

25.0

9.3

66.7

100.0 (N=9)
100.0 (N=48)

Religion
Catholic

Protestant

Lawyers

72.4

27.6

100.0 (N=29)

Non-Lawyers

48.5

51.5

100.0 (N=68)

Lawyers, as has been true elsewhere,4 5 reported that they
were a bit more "self-motivated" in their decision to seek legislative seats (Table 1c),4" but the percentage differences were
small. However, the pre-legislative political experience of
Louisiana legislators shows a pattern of lawyer/non-lawyer difference that is not typical of other assemblies. Louisiana
lawyer-legislators had less frequently held public office prior to
assuming legislative seats, and the difference was substantial:
only 32.1% of the lawyers but 55.6% of the non-lawyers had
held prior public office (Table 1d). One might suspect that the
younger age of lawyers would contribute to this, the lawyers
simply having had fewer years in which to seek other office.
However, Table le shows this suspicion to be unfounded, because the same relative position holds for those legislators
under forty years of age. It seems that in Louisiana, regardless
of age, lawyers more often achieve a state legislative seat as
45. See note 40, supra.
46. This question, from the 1972 legislator survey, was only asked of first-term
legislators.
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their first public office in a political career, while non-lawyers
arrive with more prior officeholding experience. 7
Patterns in the parental background and early political
experience of Louisiana representatives conform, with one exception, to those that the literature would suggest. Lawyers
came from families in which the father was relatively welleducated (Table 1f).4 Of the fathers of lawyers, only 37.9%
lacked a high school degree, while for non-lawyers the figure
was 61.4%. While this was to be expected given previous research, it is somewhat surprising that these better educated
families were not more politically active than the relatively less
well-educated families of non-lawyers (Table 1g). Though the
differences were slight, smaller percentages of lawyers' families
were found in the more intense categories of political activity
(supporting candidates or working in campaigns, managing
campaigns or seeking office), and this result is inconsistent
with findings elsewhere. 9 Despite this, the typical conclusion
that lawyers developed a relatively early interest in politics is
warranted in Louisiana also. Tables lh and 1i show that by a
fairly substantial margin, lawyers more often reported that
they first became interested in politics under the age of 15
(32.1% versus 10.9%) and that they first became active in
politics before the age of 21 (37.9% versus 6.8%). In terms of
future political activity, lawyers indicated that they were more
ambitious than non-lawyers in their desire to achieve political
office beyond the legislature (Table 1j). It might be thought
here too that the lawyer/non-lawyer differences could reflect
not the effects of occupation but the effects of the gap in age
between the two groups. The relatively young have potentially
longer remaining careers to contemplate, and at an earlier age
they may be less likely to consider avenues of advancement as
47. Data not presented here showed that lawyers were less likely than nonlawyers to have unsuccessfully sought public office prior to being elected to the House.
Lawyers apparently have less prior officeholding experience not because they have
tried and failed, but because they did not as often make the attempt.
48. The data on father's education, political activity of family, and age of first
interest in politics were collected in 1972 by June Savoy, who graciously allowed us
access to her study. A mail questionnaire was used and responses were received from
74 of the 105 members of the 1972 House. The overall response rate was 70.5%, but for
lawyers it was 87.5% and for non-lawyers 63.0%. For a complete description of these
and other data, see J. Savoy, supra note 6.
49. See note 37, supra, and accompanying text.
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cut off to them. Indeed, the data showed that among legislators
in general, the younger ones were more likely to express postlegislative office ambitions. 0 However, it is not the case that
lawyer/non-lawyer differences in ambition appear merely because of the age factor. When young lawyers are compared to
young non-lawyers, the ambition differential is actually greater
than. when all ages in both categories are considered. Table 1k
shows that among legislators under forty years of age, 66.7% of
the lawyers expressed a desire for office beyond the legislature
while only 30.8% of the non-lawyers acknowledged such ambitions. Among legislators over forty, there generally was much
less expressed ambition among both groups, but the nonlawyers actually were more likely than the lawyers to claim
post-legislative political aspirations (Table 11).
Table 2 contains data relating to the types of districts that
send lawyers and non-lawyers to Baton Rouge. The differences
between urban and rural districts were so slight as to suggest
that lawyers are about as likely to be selected in one place as
another (Table 2a). However, when legislative districts were
broken down by the percent of white-collar employees in their
work forces (Table 2b), a tendency was seen for high whitecollar areas to more strongly prefer lawyers than non-lawyers
as representatives. Where the white-collar percentage exceeded
50%, 44.4% of the districts were represented by lawyers, but for
both categories of districts with less than half the work force
in white-collar jobs the figure was around 27%.
TABLE 2. DISTRICT CHARACTERISTICS (IN PERCENTAGES)
OF LOUISIANA STATE REPRESENTATIVES, 1972-1975

a.

Urbanism
0-35%

36-62%

Lawyers

23.1

29.6

37.5

34.1

Non-Lawyers

76.9

70.4

62.5

65.9

100.0
(N=26)

100.0
(N=27)

63-89%

100.0
(N=16)

90-100%

100.0
(N=41)

50. Of legislators under forty years of age, 50% indicated an ambition to achieve
some post-legislative office, while only 21% of those forty or over expressed this desire.
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White-Collar Employment

Under 35%

35-50%

Over 50%

Lawyers

27.3

27.5

44.4

Non-Lawyers

72.7

72.5

55.6

c.

100.0

100.0

100.0

(N=36)

(N=38)

(N=37)

Region in Louisiana
North

Florida

Southwest

N.O. Area

Parishes
Lawyers

22.6

26.7

39.4

35.5

Non-Lawyers

77.4

73.3

60.6

64.5

100.0

100.0

100.0

(N=31)

(N=15)

(N=33)

100.0

(N=31)

The traditional regions of Louisiana differed somewhat in
the extent to which they were represented by attorneys (Table
2c), and the southern part of Louisiana seems more hospitable
than North Louisiana or the Florida parishes to lawyer politicians aspiring to the legislature. This tendency undoubtedly
contributed to the religious differences between lawyers and
non-lawyers shown in Table 1m. It seems that more lawyers
were Catholic (72.4% as compared to 48.5% for non-lawyers)
because more lawyers represented the most Catholic parts of
the state.
With slight exception, based upon the characteristics of
legislators, Louisiana lawyers and non-lawyers seemed to parallel those same groups in other legislative bodies. If it should
be proven by subsequent research that behavioral differences
between them were unique to Louisiana, then factors other
than the nature of the two groups themselves will have to be
looked to for the explanation.
2.

The Independence Thesis

The view that attorneys in legislative assemblies behave
more independently than non-lawyers is one of the more politi-
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cally significant hypotheses concerning their behavior. However, as noted above, the concept of independence has not been
explicitly defined. In a complex political environment in which
myriad demands are made upon our elected representatives,
the challenges to their personal independence no doubt come
often and from many directions. The present study conceives
of the notion of independence as involving the legislator's ability to resist these pressures and to act in accordance with his
or her own attitudes and values. The executive branch, interest
groups, and even a legislator's constituents may pose potential
challenges to his ability to decide questions on the basis of
personal judgment, although, of course, a legislator's predilections will not necessarily conflict with the views of any of the
three possible sources of pressure.
The data contain several items that bear directly on the
independence of legislators in each of these contexts. In the
1972 survey of Louisiana legislators, each was asked: "In general, how heavily do you think a legislator ought to weigh the
governor's preferences in making his decision on how to vote on
a bill?" Table 3a contains the responses for lawyers and nonlawyers. Lawyers were more likely to indicate that the governor's views should be given limited or no consideration (46.7%,
as opposed to 25.7% for non-lawyers), and lawyers were less
likely to respond that consideration should be heavy or greater
than other factors (6.7% for lawyers and 24.3% for nonlawyers). These self-reports of the lesser weight that lawyerlegislators felt should be placed on the governor's preferences
corresponded to a reputational measure of how much support
lawyers had in fact given the governor. A panel of seven close
observers of the Louisiana legislature was asked to rate each
representative's "stance relative to support for Governor Edwards in legislative matters."'" Based upon the cumulative re51. The seven individuals were members of the capitol press corps or employees
of the legislature during 1972 through 1975. The panel was asked to place each legislator in one of these categories: Strongly Tends to Support, Tends to Support, About
Equal Support and Opposition, Tends to Oppose, and Strongly Tends to Oppose. The
responses were given numerical scores and then totaled and averaged for each legislator. Based on the average.rating, legislators were placed in the three categories shown

in Table 3b. The members of the panel tended to rate legislators similarly, enhancing
confidence in this reputational measure. Coefficients of association (gamma) among
the seven ratings were all above .64 and averaged .80.
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sponses of the panel, legislators were categorized according to
whether they tended to support the Governor, supported and
opposed him in about equal proportions, or tended to oppose
the Governor. Table 3b shows that lawyers were less likely to
be found among Governor Edwards' supporters. Only 37.1% of
the attorneys, but 78.7% of their colleagues, were classified as
tending to support the governor. Over twice as many lawyers
as non-lawyers were in the equal-support-and-opposition category and a larger percentage of attorneys were considered inclined to oppose the governor.
TABLE 3. THE INDEPENDENCE THESIS: ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR (IN
PERCENTAGES) OF LOUISIANA STATE REPRESENTATIVES, 1972-1975

a.

Legislators' View of the Weight That Should Be Given to Governor's

Preference in Casting Roll Call Votes

None or
Limited
Consideration

Equal to
Other
Factors

Heavy
Consideration
or Greater
Than Other
Factors

Lawyers
Non-Lawyers

b.

c.

6.7

100.1 (N=30)

24.3

100.0 (N=70)

Reputational Assessment of Tendency to Support Governor
Edwards in Legislative Voting
Tend to
Support
Governor

About
Equal
Support,
Opposition

Tend to
Oppose
Governor

Lawyers

37.1

40.0

22.9

100.0 (N=35)

Non-Lawyers

78.7

16.0

5.3

100.0 (N=75)

Support for Gubernatorial Candidates in 1971 Primaries
Supported Some
Candidate

Supported No
Candidate

Lawyers

30.4

69.5

99.9 (N=23)

Non-Lawyers

47.1

52.9

100.0 (N=51)
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Self-Report of Whether Legislators Feel They Ought
to Represent Specific Groups*
One or More
Named

None Named
Lawyers

56.7

100.0 (N=30)

Non-Lawyers

68.6

100.0 (N=70)

*The list of groups that legislators were asked to choose from consisted of:
business, labor, religion, agriculture, local government, and political party.
e.

f.

Legislators' Opinions of Whether the Legislature Would Work
Better or Worse "If Interest Groups in General
Were Less Active in Trying to Influence Legislation"
Better

About the
Same

Lawyers

27.6

20.7

51.7

100.0 (N=29)

Non-Lawyers

16.6

25.8

57.5

99.9 (N-66)

Self-Report of Whether There Are Groups Whose Approval of
the Job Performance of a Legislator is Especially
Important to the Legislator
Some Group
Named

No Group
Named

Lawyers

28.6

71.4

100.0 (N=21)

Non-Lawyers

50.0

50.0

100.0 (N=54)

g.

h.

Worse

Representational Role Orientation
Delegate

Politico

Trustee

Lawyers

14.3

42.9

42.9

100.1 (N=28)

Non-Lawyers

33.9

45.2

21.0

100.1 (N=62)

Legislators' Assessment of the Extent to Which the "Average Voter"
in Their Districts Has Specific Preferences On the Most
Important Bills That Are Voted On
Only a
Few Do

Some Do

Most Do

Lawyers

46.7

26.7

26.7

100.1 (N-30)

Non-Lawyers

27.1

31.4

27.1

31.4

41.4
41.4

99.9 (N=70)
99.9 (N=70)
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Extent to Which Legislators Report That They Know the Feelings of
the "Average Voter" in Their Districts On Issues That Concern Them
Hardly
Ever

Sometimes

Lawyers

6.9

34.5

58.6

Non-Lawyers

4.3

15.7

80.0 100.0 (N=70)

i.

Almost
Always
100.0 (N=29)

Percent Support for Strengthening the Legislative
Institution on Ten Roll Calls

Lawyers
Non-Lawyers

0-50%

51-80%

3.1

28.1

68.8

100.0 (N=32)

28.6

47.1

24.3

100.0 (N=70)

81-100%

The lesser legislative support of Governor Edwards by attorneys, of course, could reflect attitudes toward this particular
chief executive. However, the 1972 survey suggested that in
general there may be a greater aloofness by lawyers from the
governorship, whoever occupies it. When asked whether they
had supported any candidate for governor in the heavily contested 1971 primaries, only 30.4% of the lawyers responded
affirmatively while the corresponding figure for non-lawyers
was 47.1% (Table 3c).
Three items in Table 3 relate to legislators' views of interest groups in the legislative process. All legislators interviewed
in the 1972 survey were asked a series of questions about the
way in which they approached the job of being a representative. One question presented a series of specific groups
-business, labor, religious, agricultural, local government,
and political party-and asked each respondent whether he or
she felt that they "ought to represent" these groups. As Table
3d shows, lawyers were somewhat less likely than non-lawyers
to designate any group. The percentage differences were only
moderate, however; 43.3% of lawyers and 31.4% of the nonlawyers identified none of these groups. The legislators also
were asked whether they felt that the legislature would work

19781

POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF LAWYERS

better, the same, or worse if interest groups were less active in
trying to influence legislation. By a modest margin (Table 3e),
lawyers said the legislative process would work better with less
active interest groups (27.6% for lawyers and 16.6% for nonlawyers). It is interesting to note, however, that a majority of
representatives in both categories felt that the legislature
would be harmed by reduced interest group activity. Finally,
legislators were asked whether there were "any particular
groups or individuals whose approval of your performance as a
legislator is especially important to you?" Table 3f shows that
just over a quarter of the lawyers but exactly half of the nonlawyers identified some group (no individuals were named).
Desiring approval by particular groups may in no way necessitate a surrender of independence to them, but it suggests at
least that lawyers may operate with fewer outside reference
points in their legislative decision making.
The third potential source of pressure on legislators is their
constituency. One might suppose that if lawyer-legislators are
more inclined to resist executive and interest group demands,
then they may be relatively free to reflect the views of their
constituency. This expectation is bolstered by the observation
of some that the lawyer representing his constituents plays a
role with which he' ought to be particularly comfortable given
2
the analogy with the professional role of representing clients.1
However, the data suggest that attorneys indicate less responsiveness to constituents than non-lawyers. The most direct evidence of this attitudinal stance is shown in Table 3g, which
compares lawyers and non-lawyers according to the three traditional "representational role orientations,"-trustee, politico,
and delegate. As the term is used in political science, the trustee feels that "in his decision-making he should be left free to
reach an independent judgment-independent, that is, from
his [political] clienteles-on the basis of his principles and
convictions, or on the basis of his appraisal of the facts." The
delegate, on the other hand, "feels obliged to follow whatever
mandate or instructions may be given him by his [political]
clienteles," or at least feels it necessary to weigh their views
heavily.53 The politico is one who either rejects both of these
52.
53.

H. EuLAu & J. SPRAGUE, supra note 1, at 89.
Id. at 90.
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views, asserts that he accepts them both, or claims to follow
sometimes one and sometimes the other position. Table 3g
classifies lawyers and non-lawyers into each of these categories." The differences are fairly substantial, with lawyers about
twice as likely as non-lawyers to be trustees. The discovery that
lawyers disproportionately adopted the more independent role
orientation is consistent with expectations and with the pattern of the other evidence on independence. However, one
study of several states which presented data on these same
roles for lawyers and non-lawyers produced varying results. In
their four-state study, Eulau and Sprague found no lawyer/non-lawyer differences in representational roles in New Jersey and Tennessee. In California, lawyers were more likely to
be trustees, but in Ohio it was the non-lawyers who were trustees to a relatively large degree. 55 The tendency for Louisiana
lawyer-legislators to adopt the trustee role is not necessarily
part of a general inclination of attorneys to do so.
Two other items relating to legislators and their constituencies are of interest. Tables 3h and 3i show the extent to
which legislators felt that "the average voter" in their district
had preferences on the most important legislative measures
and the extent to which legislators said that they knew the
preferences of "the average voter" on the issues that concerned
him. On both counts lawyers ranked behind non-lawyers. Attorneys were not as likely to feel that as many voters had pref54. The classification was based on two items in the 1972 survey. Legislators were
asked, to indicate on a scale of from -4 to +4 the extent to which they agreed or
disagreed with these two statements: 1) "My job as a representative is to work for what
the group [that the legislator feels he ought to represent] wants even though this may
not always agree with my personal views;" 2) "As a legislator I expect to have better

sources of information than the group I represent. Therefore, I would vote as I think
best even when the group that I represent disagrees." Legislators who agreed with
statement 1 and disagreed with statement 2 were called delegates. Those who agreed
with statement 2 and disagreed with statement 1 were classified as trustees. Additionally, alegislator was classified as a delegate if he or she agreed with statement 1, but
answered "don't know" to statement 2; the legislator was classified as a trustee if the
response was to agree with statement 2, but give a "don't know" answer to statement
1. All other legislators interviewed-those who agreed with both statements or who

disagreed with both-were put in the politico category.
55. H. EuiAu & J. SPRAGuo, supra note 1,at 91. Eulau and Sprague used different
methods of assigning legislators to categories than the present study does. Their data
showed that 28.1% of legislators could not be classified and were shown in a "not
ascertained" category.
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erences, and they were not as inclined to say that they knew
whatever voter preferences did exist. These opinions could justify in a legislator's mind the adoption of a trustee role orientation, or perhaps a trustee's perception of constituency i-s colored by pre-existing positions about the preferred representational role. Whatever the causal processes, the present data on
representational roles and perception of constituency all seem
to suggest that lawyer-legislators possess more substantial
mental buffers between themselves and their constituencies
than non-lawyers.
The evidence of legislator independence examined so far
all tends to support the hypothesis that lawyers are relatively
more independent in their behavior than non-lawyers. This was
true with respect to the executive and constituency, and to a
somewhat less dramatic degree, with interest groups. With the
exception of the reputational indicator of support for Governor
Edwards, the analysis has been based on attitudinal data collected from legislators. However, the record of the 1972-1975
Louisiana House presents 'an excellent opportunity to see
whether the voting behavior of legislators varied when issues
relevant to legislative independence came before them.
In Louisiana, as in many American legislatures, the period
from the late 1960's to the mid 1970's was an exceedingly productive period in terms of changes designed to strengthen the
legislative institution." While the reform agenda was by no
means exhausted and not all proposed reforms passed, significant improvements were made in committee structure and
functioning, floor procedures, legislative facilities, compensation, and staff capability. Many of these reforms were offered
with the intent to give the legislature a greater capacity to
make decisions in a more efficient, competent manner and to
make the institution less dependent on the informational input
of outsiders, especially the executive. In short, one may reasonably perceive legislative changes that occurred as being directly related to legislative independence.
This study has been examining the personal political independence of legislators, and this quality suggests an hypothe56. Patterson, American State Legislaturesand Public Policy in PoLITcS IN THE
AMERICAN STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 143 (H. Jacob and K. Vines eds. 3d ed.
1976).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

sis: if lawyers are politically independent, then they more than
others may strive to develop legislative institutions that are
independent also. Indeed, if lawyer-legislators are personally
independent, then they may feel that they require a relatively
independent institutional environment in which to operate
effectively. Specifically, lawyers may possess a greater sensitivity to the separation of the legislative and executive branches
and to the need for a competent, professional legislature.
To investigate this behavioral dimension of support for the
legislature as an independent institution, all 1365 "contested"
roll call votes (those in which at least 10% of those voting were
on the losing side) in the Louisiana House from 1972 through
1975 were examined to identify votes on measures commonly
recognized as innovations that potentially would have
strengthened the legislative branch of government." Ten such
votes were identified, involving final passage of bills relating to
four distinct "reform" issues (Table 4).11 Although each proposal was favored by a majority of the representatives, the
percentage in opposition varied considerably, ranging from
only 13.5 to 46.3.
Four of the votes involved the issue of increased benefits
and/or resources for legislative service. These included one vote
on a bill providing funding to rent and equip an office in each
legislator's district and to hire one or more full or part-time
legislative assistants for each representative (Vote 1, Table 4).
Three other bills increased the compensation for legislators
based upon travel expenses. One bill (Vote 2) increased the rate
of compensation, while Votes 3 and 4 both increased the rate
and extended the applicability of the allowance in terms of the
number of trips and types of legislative activities covered."
57. For discussions of such innovations, see, e.g., M. JEWELL & S. PAr'rERSON,
supra note 4, at 118-19; Press, Second Thoughts on Strengthening State Legislatures,
4 PuBLius 117-122 (1974). The years 1972 through 1975 correspond to the four-year term
of office of the legislators interviewed in 1972.
58. Although each of the ten votes happened to be on final passage, the 1365 rollcalls examined included votes on amendments and a variety of procedural motions as
well. To be selected, a vote had to present clearly the issue of legislative independence
or professionalism. In making these judgments, the following sources were utilized: the
text of bills and amendments, the existing statutes, press coverage of legislative sessions (two Baton Rouge newspapers and one New Orleans newspaper), and interviews
with present and former employees of the Louisiana Legislative Council.
59. Vote 3 was on a bill that, in addition to raising the rate of compensation per
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TABLE 4.

SUPPORT FOR STRENGTHENING THE LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTION

ON TEN ROLL CALLS IN THE LOUISIANA HOUSE, 1972-1975

Vote
No.

Subject (Bill, Year)

Percent Support For Bill

All
Lawyers

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

NonLawyers

Legislators

To provide funds to legislators for rent and supplies for
a district office and to pay
salary of legislative assistants. La. H.B. 937, 35th
Reg. Sess. (1972).

86.2

80.9

82.5

To increase the rate of compensation for travel. La. H.B.
408, 37th Reg. Sess. (1974).

82.6

70.4

74.0

To increase rate of compensation for travel and remove
restrictions on the number
of trips covered (eight per
year under then existing
law). La. H.B. 336, 37th
Reg. Sess. (1974).

90.0

76.8

80.3

To increase rate of compensation for travel; liberalize
the limit on number of trips
covered; and extend coverage to attendance at interim
committee meetings and
other interim legislative
functions. La. H.B. 392, 1st
Reg. Sess. (1975).

95.7

82.4

86.5

To permit pre-filing of measures and the pre-session
consideration of such measures by the standing committees. La. H. Res. No. 17,
36th Reg. Sess. (1973).

83.3

75.0

77.7

To dedicate $6 million to
construct a Legislative Facilities Complex to house
legislators' offices and
committee meeting rooms. La.
H.B. 149, 35th Reg. Sess.
(1972).

80.0

61.5

67.4
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Vote
No.

7.

8.

9.

10.

Subject (Bill, Year)

Percent Support For Bill

Lawyers

NonLawyers

All
Legislators

To authorize $8.5 million in
bonds to construct a Legislative Facilities Complex
to house legislators' offices
and committee meeting
rooms. La. H.B. 219, 36th
Reg. Sess. (1973).

81.3

67.7

72.2

To abolish the gubernatorially
appointed Legislative
Budget Committee and
transfer its budget review
powers to the standing committees. La. H.B. 291, 36th
Reg. Sess. (1973).

90.5

52.6

62.8

Same issue as Vote 8. La.
H.B. 1591, 37th Reg. Sess.
(1974).

82.8

40.9

53.7

Same issue as Votes 8 and 9.
La. H.B. 1348, 1st Reg.
Sess, (1975).

78.3

53.2

60.0

A second issue involved a 1973 change in the rules to allow
the pre-filing of bills and the holding of hearings on these bills
by standing committees prior to the beginning of a legislative
session (Vote 5). Especially in a legislature which at the time
was authorized to meet only sixty days in even numbered years
and thirty days in odd numbered years,10 the extension of commile, removed entirely any limits on the number of trips that were covered (eight per
year at that time). Vote 4 raised the rate of compensation also and retained a liberalized limit on the number of trips (one per calendar week rather than eight per year),
but additionally extended coverage to attendance at interim committee meetings,
meetings of the Legislative Council and its subcommittees, and attendance at the
annual Pre-Session Orientation Conference for legislators. Louisiana legislators receive
no flat salary and their compensation consists of a per diem allowance, a flat rate
expense allowance, and a mileage allowance. In 1977, Louisiana's legislators received
an average of over $18,000 per year from these sources. New Orleans Times Picayune,
May 5, 1978, § 1, at 5.
60. LA. CONST. of 1921, art. 3, § 8. Louisiana's legislature under the new state
constitution, which became effective in 1975, is still a part-time body, although its
sessions have been extended to sixty legislative days within an eighty-five calendar day
period each year. LA. CONST. art. 3, § 2.
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mittee activity into the interim period had the potential to
increase the capacity for thorough, competent, and independent consideration of proposed legislation. The third issue involved a two-year effort to fund the planning, construction, and
equipping of a Legislative Facilities Complex that would provide space for offices for individual legislators and staff and
meeting rooms for standing committees (Votes 6 and 7).
The fourth issue involved a three-year attempt to abolish
the gubernatorially-appointed Legislative Budget Committee
(Votes 8-10)"'and to transfer its powers to the House Appropriations and Senate Finance Committees." The Legislative
Budget Committee bills involved issues of separation of powers, not only because of the Committee's composition, but also
because of its function. The Committee is responsible for working with the Office of the Governor and the Division of Administration on the preparation of the executive budget, which is
later submitted to the legislature. The Budget Committee receives executive agency requests for funds, holds interim hearings, and may subpoena witnesses and require the production
of books and records. It is authorized to hire a staff and to
engage in research generally pertaining to its budgetary functions. Its recommendations are advisory to the executive
branch, and only when the executive budget is completed and
introduced as legislation, does it go to the House Appropriations and Senate Finance Committees. These committees have
the authority to amend the executive budget, but their activities are largely compressed into the time cpnstraints of a legislative session. The bills abolishing the Budget Committee provided that standing legislative committees would receive
agency budget requests, and, using the same powers and resources formerly given the Budget Committee, would prepare
a legislative budget separate and distinct from the executive
budget. This legislation clearly involved issues of legislative
61. Of the twenty-three legislators serving on this committee, nineteen are appointed by the governor for a four-year term concurrent with his own. The other
legislators serve ex officio.
62. The 1972 version of the bill did not specify the House Appropriations and
Senate Finance Committees, but rather allowed the respective chambers to designate
the committees that would perform the expanded budgetary role. The three bills-one
each in 1973, 1974, and 1975-differed in some details but were essentially the same.
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independence from the executive branch, and
the issue was
3
presented precisely this way in floor debate.
As evident from Table 4, lawyers were overwhelmingly
supportive of all these proposals. The proportion of lawyers in
favor of them ranged from 78.3 to 95.7%, and only once did it
drop below 80%. The average support by lawyers was 85.1%, an
impressive record of cohesive voting. Non-lawyers also tended
to support these proposals, but to a substantially lesser extent.
Over the ten roll calls, non-lawyers' support varied from 40.9
to 82.4% and averaged 66.1%. Among the non-lawyers, support
was greatest for proposals increasing legislative benefits. The
legislative facilities complex issue received less support from
the non-lawyers, and the issue of abolishing the Budget Committee substantially divided that group. Lawyer-legislators,
however, maintained impressive cohesion in support of reform
on all issues, including those that divided their colleagues. In
general, as overall legislative support for these reforms declined, it was the lawyers who stood firm and the non-lawyers
who dropped back. The relative differences between lawyers
and non-lawyers are rather dramatically shown in Table 3j,
which shows breakdowns of a simple index that is based upon
the percent of votes cast in support of a more professional and
independent legislature over the ten roll calls. While the support was generally high from all legislators, 68.8% of the
lawyer-legislators supported the reform position on over 80% of
the votes, as compared to only 24.3% of non-lawyers. Similarly,
only one attorney (3.1%) fell below 50% support while 28.6% of
the non-lawyers were found in that range.
As noted earlier, this study cannot claim to have exhausted with these data all possible dimensions of the notion
of independence. Legislators make thousands of decisions in a
session and each one may afford an opportunity to exercise
judgment in a different fashion. However, a substantial
amount of evidence has been presented on an aspect of legisla63. The bill's principal author, Rep. Frank Simoneaux of Baton Rouge, stated
in debate: "Members of the legislature have no business performing the duties and
functions of preparing the executive budget . . . . When they cross that line and
perform the executive function, they give something in return. It's not corruption I'm
suggesting. It is legislative independence." Morning Advocate (Baton Rouge), July 4,
1974, § A, at 8.
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tive behavior on which lawyers and non-lawyers have not been
previously compared. This evidence runs clearly in one direction: relative to non-lawyers, there are grounds to believe that
lawyer-legislators exercise a greater degree of political independence.
3.

The Dominant Bloc, Competence, and Conservatism

Theses
The expectations that underlie the dominant bloc thesis
are not supported by the data on Louisiana House members.
In an attempt to discover whether lawyers agreed more among
themselves than with non-lawyers, the percentage of votes on
which each legislator agreed with each other legislator was calculated for all 1365 contested roll calls between 1972 and 1975.
This operation produced a matrix of percent agreement scores
with one entry for each legislator paired with every other legislator. Analysis of the average agreement levels among lawyers
and among non-lawyers shows that in general roll call voting,
neither group constituted a cohesive voting bloc. Among lawyers only, the mean percent agreement was 60.4%, and among
non-lawyers, 61.3%. When each lawyer was paired with every
non-lawyer and the cross-group percentages of agreement were
averaged, a figure of 60.1% resulted. It is evident that in
general roll call voting lawyers and non-lawyers as groups did
not constitute voting blocs. If two subsets of representatives
had been drawn by random sample from the general legislative
population, it is unlikely that their overall voting agreement
would have been much different than that of lawyers and nonlawyers. With these findings in mind it is not surprising that
an analysis of the 1365 contested votes also shows that only
rarely did lawyer and non-lawyer groups significantly oppose
one another. On just 8 of 1365 votes did as many as two-thirds
of the lawyers vote on one side of an issue while at least twothirds of the non-lawyers occupied the other. If the standard is
relaxed to 60%, then only another 31 votes are added."
However devastating these figures are to the possibility of
bloc voting on the basis of occupational background, the analy64. These votes have no discernible subject matter focus, but rather span a wide
range of substantive areas.
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sis of voting on measures designed to strengthen the legislature
demonstrated that occasionally there may be politically significant subsets of issues on which there are at at least important
relative differences in lawyer/non-lawyer voting patterns. The
issue of no-fault insurance is another example. Consistent with
the findings of Dyer, 5 Louisiana legislators seemed influenced
by their professions in the degree of support that they gave to
the "no-fault" insurance plans that came before the legislature. Tables 5a and 5b show the voting on no-fault bills on final
passage in 1972 and 1974. In both years, 1972 especially, there
was a marked difference in lawyer and non-lawyer support for
no-fault. In 1972 just over half (54.8%) of the lawyer-legislators
supported no-fault, while 81.8% of non-lawyers cast a yea vote.
On the 1974 bill lawyer support was about the same (51.9%
yea) while non-lawyers dropped back to 68.3%, still appreciably above that of lawyers."6
TABLE 5. THE DOMINANT BLOC, COMPETENCE, AND CONSERVATISM THESES:
ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR (IN PERCENTAGES) OF LOUISIANA STATE
REPRESENTATIVES, 1972-1975

a.

Support For "No-Fault" Insurance, 1972
Yea

Nay

Total

Lawyers

54.8

45.2

100.0 (N=31)

Non-Lawyers

81.8

18.2

100.0 (N=66)

b.

Support For "No-Fault" Insurance, 1974
Yea

Nay

Lawyers

51.9

48.1

100.0 (N=27)

Non-Lawyers

68.3

31.7

100.0 (N=63)

c.

Total

Reputation as Effective Legislators
Below
Lawyers
Non-Lawyers

Above

Average

Average

6.1

60.6

33.3

100.0 (N=33)

42.0

40.0

17.4

99.4 (N=68)

Average

65. See Dyer, supra note 11.
66. Several procedural votes on no-fault were taken over these years and they
also show substantial differences in voting by lawyers and non-lawyers.
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d.

e.

Average Number of Bills Introduced Per Session, 1972-1975
15.7-40.0

40.1-60.0

60.1-132.0

Lawyers

17.6

38.2

44.1

99.9 (N=34)

Non-Lawyers

42.1

34.2

23.7

100.0 (N=76)

Average Number of Floor Amendments Introduced Per Session,
1972, 1974, and 1975*

Lawyers

1.5 or
less

1.6-3.5

3.6 or more

3.4

34.5

62.1

100.0 (N=29)

18.8

99.9 (N=69)

Non-Lawyers

*The 1973 session was excluded because it was a fiscal session and did not
include the same range of bill subject matter as other legislative sessions.
f.

Self-Described Political Philosophy
Conservative

Moderate

Liberal

Lawyers

21.4

35.7

42.9

100.0 (N=28)

Non-Lawyers

55.4

35.4

9.2

100.0 (N=65)

In discussing the views that underlie the competence thesis, it was acknowledged that the concept is not a precise one.
There undoubtedly are many kinds of competence relevant to
legislative service, and even more opportunities for legislators
to demonstrate that they have it or lack it. This study is able
to provide some general data on the question, but cannot claim
to offer definitive tests of hypotheses about lawyer/non-lawyer
differentials in ability.
Tables 5c, 5d, and 5e contain three breakdowns of interest.
The first is a reputational measure of legislator effectiveness
obtained from the same panel of close legislative observers that
rated tendencies to support or oppose Governor Edwards. Each
member of the panel was asked to designate each representative as average, above average, or below average "in their ability to influence the outcome of the legislative process." 7 Table
67. The responses from the panel were totaled and averaged in the same manner
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5c contains the results, and it is evident that lawyers fared
relatively well. More lawyers than non-lawyers were rated
above average (33.3% versus 17.4%), but it is in the category
of below average legislators that the contrast is most striking;
42% of the non-lawyers were rated in the lowest category of
effectiveness, as compared to only 6.1% of the lawyers.
Tables 5d and 5e present evidence on the frequency with
which legislators offered amendments and introduced bills and
resolutions. These measures do not necessarily relate directly
to competence, because an amendment may be well or poorly
drawn and presented; but they do reflect activities that constitute important elements of a legislator's job. Lawyers were considerably more prolific on both counts (Table 5d and 5e); almost twice as high a percentage of lawyers (44.1% to 23.7%)
were found in the category of legislators who introduced the
most measures." The difference in sponsoring amendments is
even more striking: 62.1% of the lawyers, but only 18.8% of the
non-lawyers, were in the high category. 9
The tendency for attorneys to introduce more bills may be
a product of greater individual motivation, but it may be related as well to their reputation for effectiveness. Interest
groups, the executive, and other outsiders, who frequently
spawn the legislation that friendly representatives sponsor,
would seem likely to seek out the most effective members of the
legislature to promote their cause. Presumably more demands
of this type are placed on the more competent legislators.
The substantial differences found in the frequency of offering amendments demonstrate that occupational background
relates to the way this aspect of a legislator's job is performed.
The training of lawyers immediately suggests the possibility
that their prolificacy results from technical amendments designed to improve the language and clarify the meaning of new
legislation. While this is plausible, there is no evidence available on the nature of the amendments, and it may be equally
as with the ratings of support for Governor Edwards. See note 51, supra. Coefficients
of association (gamma) among these seven ratings were all above .52 and averaged .73.
68. A legislator was counted as introducing a measure if he or she was its sole
author or co-author.
69. The figures reflect only amendments to other legislators' bills because
amendments to legislation initially sponsored by the individual were excluded.
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reasonable to believe that attorneys offer more amendments
because their legal training gives them greater skill and confidence in drafting amendments of all sorts.70
The greater effectiveness and legislative activity of lawyers, while relevant to the competence thesis, may also be germane in considering the dominant bloc theme. It has been
shown that neither lawyers nor non-lawyers constitute cohesive
voting blocs and that neither group can be said to dominate the
legislative process. However, if lawyer-legislators are both more
effective and more active, then on an individual and personal
basis they might be considered dominant. Perhaps it is these
characteristics that have led some observers to feel that lawyers
tend to run legislatures.
The lack of distinctive roll call patterns by lawyers and
non-lawyers in general legislative voting does not compel the
conclusion that the two groups are indistinguishable in their
political attitudes. Table 5f shows that there were marked differences in the self-described political philosophies of the two
groups. The conservatism thesis to the contrary, lawyers in the
Louisiana House were much more likely than non-lawyers to
describe their own political philosophy as liberal: 42.9% of the
lawyers chose the liberal label, while only 9.2% of the nonlawyers placed themselves in that category. Almost identical
portions of each group said that they were moderates (around
35%), but only 21.4% of the lawyers preferred the conservative
designation as opposed to over half (55.4%) of the non-lawyers.
That lawyers and non-lawyers differed substantially in their
self-described political philosophy, and yet did not generally
vote differently, is perhaps a telling comment on the relevance
of the traditional philosophical categories with respect to issues
coming before the Louisiana legislature.
4.

The Generalist Thesis

It is a distinctive feature of many American legislative
bodies that their rules, structures, and informal norms promote
specialization and expertise. This is especially true of Congress
70.

For an analysis of differences between lawyers and non-lawyers based on the

number of bills they introduced and how far the bills went in the legislative process,
see Singleton, Attorney Members of the 1972 Kentucky Senate, 1 J. POL. Sci. 93-104
(1974).
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with its committee system, and in varying degrees the states
follow the national model. The extent to which legislators tend
to specialize in certain policy areas is accordingly a significant
dimension of how they perform their jobs, and the premise of
the generalist thesis is that lawyers may not be as inclined to
concentrate their interests and activities as their colleagues.
In the 1972 survey, legislators were asked directly whether
they considered themselves especially well informed on any
particular type of legislation. The results shown in Table 6a
indicate that a generalist perspective may indeed characterize
lawyer-legislators more so than non-lawyers. While a healthy
majority of all legislators claimed some specific area of expertise, lawyers were less likely (63.3%) than non-lawyers (81.2%)
to do so.
TABLE 6.

THE GENERALIST THESIS: ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR (IN

PERCENTAGES) OF LOUISIANA STATE REPRESENTATIVES, 1972-1975

a.

Legislators' View of Whether They Consider Themselves
Particularly Well Informed On Any Particular Type of Legislation

b.

c.

Yes

No

Lawyers

63.3

36.7

100.0 (N=30)

Non-Lawyers

81.2

18.8

100.0 (N=69)

Legislators' Self-Description of Importance of Committee Work
Relatively

Same As
Other

Relatively

Important

Factors

Unimportant

Lawyers

69.0

20.7

10.3

100.0 (N=29)

Non-Lawyers

89.9

4.3

5.8

100.0 (N=69)

Total Legislators' Pay (at $50 Per Diem) For Attending

Interim Committee Meetings, 1973-1975*

Lawyers

$100-$1800

$1850-$3200

$3250-$6800

63.3

16.7

20.0

100.0 (N=30)

Non-Lawyers
20.3
46.4
33.3 100.0 (N=69)
*Only legislators who served for all three years were included; the 1972
figures were unavailable in a form that distinguished 1972 service before
and after May, when the newly elected legislators took office.
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Since standing committees are the principal legislative
vehicles for achieving specialization, legislators' participation
in committee processes may be relevant to the specialist/generalist question. However, the previous writing on lawyers in the legislature, reflected in the various theses under
consideration, could lead to two conflicting expectations. On
the one hand, the generalist perspective suggests that lawyers
may not be concerned with the work of standing committees,
because they are so specialized. On the other hand, being a
generalist may not imply a reticence to participate in the deliberations of the specialized standing committees at all. A generalist approach to legislative politics could mean that a representative simply works in a broad range of subject matter
areas, with specific areas being only relatively less important
to him. The independence thesis comes into play here also,
because the expertise achieved through committee specialization is a major cornerstone of the independence of legislatures.
The committee system in Congress is widely regarded as a basis
of Congress' ability to resist the executive, and it has been
observed that foreign legislatures that are more nearly "rubber
stamp" assemblies tend to lack important committee institutions.7 ' If, as has been argued, lawyers are more independent
than their colleagues, they might be expected to place more
emphasis on committee service.
There are two items of data that speak to this issue. As
seen from Table 6b, substantial majorities of all legislators in
the 1972 survey rated committee work as "relatively important," and very few felt that it was "relatively unimportant."
However, differences between lawyers and non-lawyers did
exist, and fewer lawyers cited committees as relatively important. In addition, there are data on the frequency with which
legislators attended interim committee meetings. When they
attend interim committee sessions, legislators are compensated
at the rate of $50 per diem, and the amount of such compensation during the legislators' term may give an indication of the
emphasis that legislators place on committee work. Table 6c
supplies the figures for lawyers and non-lawyers and shows that
71.

N. POLSBY, Legislatures 257-320, in 5 F. GREENSTEIN & N. POLSBY, HANDBOOK

OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES) 278 (1975).
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lawyers participated significantly less in the interim activities
of the committee: 63.3% of the lawyers fall into the category of
legislators who attended the fewest interim meetings, while
only 20.3% of the non-lawyers were found there.72
It can only be speculated as to why these results were
obtained. It is possible that a generalist perspective, as mentioned, induces lawyers to place lower value on committee participation. Despite the fact that on several counts lawyerlegislators were found to value independence highly, including
voting to extend committee activity into the interim,7
" they did
not participate nearly as extensively as non-lawyers in the interim deliberations that they had favored. It is possible that
the demands of a legal practice operate against extensive interim participation by lawyers. Although lawyers, as discussed
earlier,7" may find it easier than others to leave their occupations to participate in politics, there nonetheless may be more
finite limits on their willingness to give of their-time beyond the
confines of regular legislative sessions. This possibility suggests
a fruitful avenue for future research on occupational differences
in legislative service.
CONCLUSION

Lawyers in politics have been the subject of considerable
contemplation in scholarly literature, and some aspects of their
behavior have been placed under close scrutiny. Previous research has documented fairly consistent differences in the personal, political, and family backgrounds of lawyer-legislators
and their colleagues. Some studies have also shown differences
in political philosophy, a generalist approach to legislative
work, patterns of recruitment to candidacy, and ambitions to
achieve post-legislative offices. When it comes to political behavior, however, both specific and general conclusions have led
authors' to assert that lawyers and non-lawyers as groups are
basically similar.
72. However, lawyers and non-lawyers fared about the same in holding committee chairmanships in the 1972-1975 House. Exactly 20% of the lawyers chaired a standing committee, as did 17.1% of their non-lawyer colleagues.
73. See the description of Vote 5 in Table 4 at note 60, supra, and accompanying
text.
74. See notes 23 and 24, supra, and accompanying text.
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This study has confirmed that there are similarities in
some areas of behavior. There is no evidence, for example, that
attorneys generally vote alike in the Louisiana House. However, with respect to other aspects of performance, some rather
consistent and striking differences were documented, particularly along dimensions of behavior that have been scantily attended to in empirical investigation. Compared to non-lawyers,
attorneys in the legislature appeared more independent politically. This was seen in many of their attitudes and also in a
willingness to support reforms that promote the independence
of the legislative institution. They were rated more effective as
legislators and certainly were more active in sponsoring legislation and offering amendments. Finally, lawyer-legislators have
been shown to be more inclined than non-lawyers to be generalists in their approach to the subject matter areas of legislation.
If the factor of occupation accounts for few of the differences
in voting patterns that one observes in the legislature, the same
cannot be said for its influence on the way that legislators go
about their jobs. While the behavioral distinctions that have
been addressed are differences of degree and not of kind, the
conclusion is inescapable from this research that several dimensions of job performance are affected by the presence or
absence of legal training and practice. Certainly the results
argue forcefully that now is not the time to abandon the task
of investigating further the influence of occupational background on the behavior of legislators, and indirectly, on the
performance of our legislative institutions themselves.

